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I. INTRODUCTION
Congress labored for twenty years to create a civil rights bill to
protect people from the evils of discrimination and bigotry.' That
long struggle produced the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 In the spring
of 1991, however, the United States Supreme Court severely re-
strained the scope of the Act. In Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion v. Arabian American Oil Co.,3 the Court held, without precedent,
that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not protect Ameri-
1. See generally CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1985).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1988), amended by Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-66, § 109, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
3. 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991).
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can citizens who work abroad for American companies.4 In the Fall
of 1991, Congress reversed the Arabian decision by enacting section
109 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which extended Title VII cover-
age to American citizens employed in foreign countries.5
This Note discusses the development of the extraterritorial appli-
cation of Title VII and the historical protections afforded American
citizens employed abroad by United States employers.6 This Note
will examine the purpose of Title VII, the history of extraterritorial
application of Title VII, and the future of Title VII as amended by
the Civil Rights Act of 1991. This Note concludes that Congress cor-
rectly overruled the Arabian decision by extending Title VII coverage
abroad because "the language, history, and administrative interpre-
tations of the statute all support application of Title VII to U.S. com-
panies employing American citizens abroad."7
II. YESTERDAY: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT OF 1964
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is widely accepted as the most impor-
tant civil rights legislation enacted in the twentieth century. 8 Title
4. Id. at 1236.
5. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, § 109, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
As of 1970, over 680,000 U.S. citizens were privately employed abroad. Debra
L.W. Cohn, Note, Equal Employment Opportunity for Americans Abroad, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1288, 1288 n.5 (1987) (citing SOCIAL & ECONOMIC STATISTICS ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, AMERICANS LIVING ABROAD (1973)). By 1987, over 35,000 Americans
were working in Saudi Arabia alone. Id. (citing Youssef M. Ibrahim, Saudis Impose an
Income Tax on Foreigners, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 5, 1988, at Al)). Cf Jonathon Turley, Trans-
national Discrimination and the Economics of Extraterritorial Regulation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 339,
389 n.289 (noting the difficulty of accurately estimating the number of United States
citizens living and working abroad).
6. For the purposes of this Note, employer means any employer that is organ-
ized under the laws of one of the several states. A company's "organization" in-
cludes the place of its incorporation, control or ownership. See also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 213 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] ("For
purposes of international law, a corporation has the nationality of the state under the
laws of which the corporation is organized.").
This Note focuses primarily on American companies doing business abroad and
the rights of the American citizens who work for such companies. For an analysis of
foreign companies doing business in the United States and alien employment in the
United States, see Charles A. Edwards, International Law and Employment Discrimination,
8 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1, 1-13 (1983). See also Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Action-
ability, Under Federal and State Antidiscrimination Legislation, of Foreign Employer's Discrimi-
nating in Favor of Foreign Workers in Hiring and Other Employment Matters, 84 A.L.R. FED.
114 (1987).
7. Arabian, 111 S. Ct. at 1246.
8. 4 JOSEPH G. COOK &JOHN L. SOBIESKI, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS 21.01,
21-4 to 21-5 (1991).
[Vol. 18
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VII is the most important part of the Act 9 because it is the first con-
gressional attempt to eliminate discrimination in employment.lO
Specifically, Title VII is aimed at eliminating discrimination "against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin." l
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co. ,12 the United States Supreme Court best
explained the goal of Title VII as "the removal of artificial, arbitrary,
and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate
invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissi-
ble classification."13 The extraterritorial application of Title VII en-
hances this goal by prohibiting American employers from violating
Title VII in their foreign operations.
A. Congressional Intent and the Extraterritorial Application of Title VII
Prior to the Arabian Decision
Congress has the undisputed power to apply the force of its laws
beyond America's geographical borders.14 But, prior to the Arabian
decision it was uncertain whether Title VII applied to U.S. employers
outside the United States. The long-standing position of the
courts, 15 the EEOC,16 and the Department ofJustice17 was that Title
9. Id.
10. 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL
RIGHTS 1020 (1970).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988). Ironically, the inclusion of "sex" in Title
VII was not in the original bill. See HUGH D. GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 136
(1990). Representative Howard Smith (Democrat, Va.) moved to add the word "sex"
to the list of protected classes. Representative Smith and the other opponents of the
Act supported this addition as a strategy to sink the bill. However, this tactic proved
detrimental to their cause as their colleagues sought to give white women the same
protections as the bill allocated to African Americans. Id. at 136-38.
12. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
13. Id. at 431. See also COOK & SOBIESKI, supra note 8, 21.01 n.24.
14. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 282 (1952).
15. See Akgun v. Boeing Co., 53 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 40,011 (W.D. Wash.
1990); Seville v. Martin Marietta Corp., 638 F. Supp. 590 (D. Md. 1986); Bryant v.
International Sch. Servs., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 472 (D.NJ. 1980), revd on other grounds,
675 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1982); Love v. Pullman Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
423 (D. Colo. 1976); see also supra notes 41-52 and accompanying text.
16. See EEOC Policy Guidance: Application of Title VII to American Companies
Overseas, Their Subsidiaries, and to Foreign Companies, No. N-915.033, EEOC RE-
LEASE No. 880P-15, reprinted in EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) $ 2391, 2392 (Sept. 2,
1988); see also supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
17. See Foreign Investment and Arab Boycott Legislation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
International Finance of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess., 165 (1975) (testimony of Assistant Attorney General stating that
Title VII applied abroad); Equal Empl. Comm. Dec. No. 90-1, 52 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1893 (Apr. 10, 1990).
1992]
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VII applied abroad. Although Congress did not explicitly state its
intent to apply Title VII abroad in the Civil Rights Act of 1964,18
provisions of the Act suggest that it was meant to transgress U.S.
borders.
First, under the definitional provisions of Title VII the words "em-
ployee," "employer" and "commerce" were defined very broadly.19
"Employee" was defined as "an individual employed by an em-
ployer."20 "Employer" was defined as "a person engaged in an in-
dustry affecting commerce." 21 "Commerce" was defined as "trade,
traffic, commerce, transportation . . . among the several States; or
between a State and any place outside thereof. " 22 Nowhere in the statute
did Congress express a territorial limit to the application of Title
VII.23 The definition of "commerce" indicated that geography
should not limit the scope of Title VII. By expressly stating that
"commerce" included activity between a state and "any place outside
thereof," the statute strongly suggests that Congress intended Title
VII to be applied abroad. 24
Second, the alien exemption clause 25 implicitly showed congres-
sional intent to apply Title VII abroad. Congress specifically ex-
cluded resident aliens working outside of the United States. 26 The
negative implication of this provision indicates that Congress in-
18. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
19. See id. § 2000e(a)-(k).
20. Id. § 2000e(0.
21. Id. § 2000e(b). The term "industry affecting commerce" meant any activity,
business, or industry in which a labor dispute would interfere with commerce or the
free flow of commerce. Id. § 2000(e)(h). "Industry affecting commerce" also in-
cluded any activity or industry affecting commerce within the meaning of the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 401, and any gov-
ernmental industry, business or activity, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(h).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(g) (1988) (emphasis added).
23. See generally id. § 2000e. The Fair Labor Standards Act, by comparison, dis-
tinctly excludes from coverage "any employee" who performs services in a foreign
country. 29 U.S.C. § 213(f) (1990). The canons of statutory construction require
that every part of a statute be considered, including subheadings, in order to arrive at
the statute's clear and total meaning. House v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d 982, 987
(5th Cir. 1972); see also Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979).
24. As stated above, see supra note 21, "industry affecting commerce" is de-
scribed as also being within the meaning of the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRD). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(h) (1988). The LMRD defined
"industry affecting commerce" within the scope of the Labor Management Relations
Act (LMRA). See 42 U.S.C. § 402(c) (1988). Although the Court, in Benz v. Compa-
nia Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138 (1958), held that the LMRA does not apply
abroad, the language of the LMRD limits itself to "the commerce of the Nation,"
thereby distinguishing itself from Title VII, where no explicit mention of boundaries
exists. See 29 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1988).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I (1988) ("This subchapter shall not apply to an employer
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tended to provide Title VII protection to non-aliens (American citi-
zens) employed abroad. Had Congress intended to exclude these
employees, it would have placed a complete exemption clause in Ti-
tle VII, not a clause exclusively exempting aliens.27 Therefore, the
most plausible explanation for the alien exemption clause was that
Congress, by specifically excluding coverage to aliens abroad, in-
tended to protect American citizens abroad.
Third, an examination of legislative history supports the conclu-
sion that the statute applied extraterritorially. Legislative history is
particularly relevant because an examination beyond the plain lan-
guage of the law is necessary when the language of a statute is not
clear.28 The Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee stated that
"Title VII covers employers engaged in . . . interstate and foreign
commerce." 2 9 After congressional debates on Title VII, the ranking
minority member of the House Judiciary Committee opined that
Congress intended to "secure to all Americans the equal protection
of the laws of the United States." 30 Still another congressman stated
that "the provisions [of Title VII] are necessary 'to remove obstruc-
tions to the free flow of commerce among the States and withforeign
nations'.... Title VII covers employers engaged in industries affect-
ing commerce-interstate, andforeign commerce .... "31
With respect to the alien exemption clause, Representative Powell
explained, "The intent of [the] exemption is to remove conflicts of
law which might otherwise exist between the United States and a for-
eign nation in the employment of aliens outside the United States by
27. Additionally, if Congress had included this clause in Title VII only to indicate
that aliens were covered in the United States, it would have rendered the clause su-
perfluous. See Beisler v. Commissioner, 814 F.2d 1304, 1307 (9th Cir. 1987) ("We
should avoid an interpretation of the statute that renders any part of it superfluous
and does not give effect to all of the words used by Congress."). Furthermore, the
term "employee" also was defined broadly ("an individual"), with no limiting lan-
guage, and sufficiently encompasses aliens. See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S.
86, 95 (1973). An alien, even without the clause, was thus covered if working within
the United States. Id. To provide otherwise would violate the Fifth Amendment.
Boureslan v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 892 F.2d 1271, 1276 (5th Cir. 1990) (King, J.,
dissenting), aff'd sub nom., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991).
28. See EEOC v. Arabian, 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1237 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
29. Janelle M. Diller, Comment, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
Multinational Enterprise, 73 GEO. L.J. 1465, 1469 (1985) (quoting Rep. Emmanuel Cel-
ler EEOC, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE VII & XI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
3094).
30. Adam M. Mycyk, Comment, United States Fair Employment Law in the Transna-
tional Employment Arena: The Case for the Extraterritorial Application of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 1109, 1115 (1990) (citing H.R. REP. No. 914,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2488 (statement of Rep.
McCulloch)).
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an American enterprise."32 The alien exemption clause was there-
fore aimed at mitigating the encroachment of Title VII into the laws
of other countries. 33
B. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Extraterritorial
Application of Title VII Prior to Arabian
The EEOC, as Title VII's enforcer,34 executes Title VII's proscrip-
tions35 and consistently issues policy guidance statements. Thus,
when an ambiguity concerning the enforcement of Title VII exists, it
is useful to look to Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
opinions on the issue. Since 1975, the EEOC has pronounced that
Title VII applies extraterritorially.36 As recently as 1988, the EEOC
reiterated this position by issuing a policy guideline stating that Title
VII applies to American citizens employed abroad.3 7
The EEOC also has construed Title VII this way in its adjudica-
tions.3 8 While Chairman of the EEOC, Supreme Court Justice Clar-
ence Thomas testified before Congress that Title VII applied abroad
because of the negative implication of the alien exemption clause.3 9
32. H.R. REP. No. 570, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1963), reprinted in Civil Rights:
Hearings on H.R. 7152 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2303 (1963) [hereinafter Civil Rights Hearings]; see also S. REP. No.
867, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 11 (1964) ("Exempted from the bill are... United States
employers employing citizens of foreign countries in foreign lands.").
33. Mycyk, supra note 30, at 1116-17.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1988).
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1988). The EEOC is charged with preventing un-
lawful employment practices. It may hold proceedings and initiate or intervene in
civil actions to enforce Title VII. Id.
36. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1245 (1991) (Marshall,J.,
dissenting). Justice Marshall quoted a letter dated March 14, 1975 from William Ca-
rey, EEOC General Counsel, to Senator Frank Church which reads as follows: "[I]t is
necessary to construe [the alien exemption clause] as expressing a Congressional in-
tent to extend the coverage of Title VII to include ... citizens in overseas operations
of domestic corporations." Id.
37. EEOC Policy Guidance: Application of Title VII to American Companies
Overseas, Their subsidiaries, and to Foreign Companies, No. N-915.033, EEOC RE-
LEASE No. 880P-15, reprinted in EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 2391 - 2392 (Sept. 2,
1988); see also id. at Part III. Part III assigns three factors in evaluating whether Title
VII should apply when international issues exist. These factors are the status of the
individual filing the charge, the status of the employer, and the status of the country.
Id.
38. EEOC Dec. No. 90-1, 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1893 (Apr. 10, 1990);
EEOC Dec. No. 85-16, 1985 EEOC Lexis, (Sept. 16, 1985); see also EEOC Dec. 84-2,
33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1983 (Dec. 2, 1983) (holding Japanese company
within the scope of Title VII even though it did no business with the United States).
39. Age Discrimination and Overseas Americans, 1983: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Aging of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1983)
(statement of Clarence Thomas, EEOC Chairman). Chairman Thomas stated that
"the alien exemption provision indicates, by implication, that Congress intended Ti-
[Vol. 18
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This statement informed Congress of the EEOC's position that the
general interpretation of Title VII included extraterritorial applica-
tion.40 Congress' failure to legislate against the EEOC interpreta-
tion suggests that it implicitly accepted this interpretation.
C. Judicial Interpretation of the Extraterritorial Application Prior to the
Arabian Decision
Prior to 1991, the Supreme Court had not ruled on the issue of
extraterritorial application of Title VII.41 Indeed, few lower courts
had addressed whether it applied abroad.42 Those courts generally
concluded that Congress did intend Title VII to apply to American
employees working abroad for American companies.43
The primary reason courts upheld extraterritorial application of
Title VII was the negative implication of the alien exemption
clause.4 4 The alien exemption clause stated that employers45 who
employed aliens outside the United States were exempt from Title
tle VII to protect American employees working for American employers outside the
United States." Id.
40. Prior to the adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Bush Administra-
tion had also declared that Title VII should apply abroad. See Multinationals: Bush
Administration Asks Supreme Court to Apply Title VII to Americans Overseas, 8 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 110 (Jan. 23, 1991); Foreign Investment and Arab Boycott Legislation: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on International Finance of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 165 (1975) (testimony of Antonin Scalia, Assis-
tant Attorney General).
41. The Court, however, had addressed extraterritorial application of other acts
of Congress. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras,
372 U.S. 10 (1963); Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138 (1957);
Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952); New York Cent. R.R. v. Chisholm,
268 U.S. 29 (1925).
42. See, e.g., Akgun v. Boeing Co., 53 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 41,011 (W.D.
Wash. 1990); Seville v. Martin Marietta Corp., 638 F. Supp. 590 (D. Md. 1986); Bry-
ant v. International Sch. Servs., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 472 (D.N.J. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, 675 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1982); Love v. Pullman Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 423 (D. Colo. 1976); see also EEOC v. Institute of Gas Tech., 23 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 825 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (discussing issue of extraterritoriality without
deciding its application); Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1162 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (considering social customs and mores in Latin America and
Southeast Asia in applying Title VII).
43. See Akgun, 53 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 40,011; Seville, 638 F. Supp. at 592;
Bryant, 502 F. Supp. at 481-83; Love, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 426.
44. See Akgun, 53 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 40,011; Seville, 638 F. Supp. at
592; Bryant, 502 F. Supp. at 482; Love, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 426 n.4.
45. "The term 'employer' means a person engaged in an industry affecting com-
merce who has fifteen or more employees ... and any agent of such a person." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988). The term does not include the United States, a corpora-
tion wholly owned by the United States, an Indian tribe, the District of Columbia, or
any bona fide private membership club. Id.
1992]
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VII restrictions.46 The negative implication was that "[s]ince Con-
gress explicitly excluded aliens employed outside [the United States],
it must have intended to provide relief to American citizens em-
ployed outside of any state... by an employer otherwise covered."4 7
Courts also had considered whether the limitation of Title VII to
United States borders could be supported by analogies to other acts
of Congress that either specifically stated jurisdiction or were judi-
cially interpreted not to apply outside the United States.48 The
courts generally have held these analogies irrelevent. 4 9 At least one
court determined that the negative implication of the alien exemp-
tion clause outweighs the presumption against extraterritoriality of
domestic laws. 50 The presumption against extraterritoriality is a
common-law doctrine which presumes that Congress intended a law
to apply only domestically unless Congress has made a "clear state-
ment" to the contrary. 5 ' The court found that the negative implica-
tion doctrine overcame the presumption against extraterritoriality.52
D. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Arabian
American Oil Co.
1. The Majority Opinion
The United States Supreme Court, in Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v. Arabian American Oil Co., held that Title VII did not pro-
tect American citizens working abroad for American employers.53
46. Id. § 2000e-1.
47. Love, 13 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 426 n.4.
48. See Bryant v. International Sch. Servs., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 472, 481-83 (D.N.J.
1980).
49. Id.
50. Seville v. Martin Marietta Co., 638 F. Supp. 590, 592 (D. Md. 1986); see also
Love v. Pullman Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 423 (D. Colo. 1976).
51. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1237 (1991) (Marshall,J.,
dissenting).
52. Seville, 638 F. Supp. at 592. However, this presumption was found to be valid
if a possibility of international discord results from a court following U.S. law in a
case involving international issues. See Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353
U.S. 138, 146-47 (1957).
53. 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991). In Arabian, the plaintiff, Ali Boureslan, was a natural-
ized U.S. citizen. Id. at 1227. In 1979, Aramco Service Company (ASC), a subsidiary
of Arabian American Oil, hired Mr. Boureslan. In November 1980, he transfered to
Aramco in Saudi Arabia. Id. at 1229-30. In September 1982, Mr. Boureslan's super-
visor allegedly began harassing Mr. Boureslan on account of his national origin, race
and religion. Mr. Boureslan alleged that this discrimination ultimately led to his dis-
charge in June 1984. Id. at 1230. Mr. Boureslan, after filing a discrimination charge
with the EEOC against Aramco and ASC, initiated suit against both companies alleg-
ing Title VII violations due to harassment and termination based on his race, religion
and national origin. Id.
For an informative discussion of the EEOC Title VII procedures, see Mycyk,
supra note 30, at 1114.
[Vol. 18
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The Court arrived at this decision by analyzing the four arguments
made by the EEOC. First, the Court found that the presumption
against extraterritorial application of U.S. laws had not been over-
come. 54 Second, the Court held that the definitions of the words
"employer," "commerce," "states" and the corresponding com-
merce clause "between a State and any place outside thereof" did
not indicate congressional intent to apply Title VII extraterritorially
because this language is also found in other Acts of Congress previ-
ously held not to apply beyond United States borders.55 Third, the
Court refused to find that the negative implication of the alien ex-
emption clause clearly indicated congressional intent because it was
unwilling to decide such delicate issues of international law.56
Fourth, the Court determined that the EEOC guidelines had been
inconsistent over the years and were therefore of limited persuasive-
ness.5 7 The Court concluded by stating that Congress knows how to
place a statute within its jurisdictional realm and may amend a stat-
ute accordingly.58
54. Arabian, 111 S. Ct. at 1236. The Court stated that unless clear congressional
intent of extraterritorial application exists, "we must presume [Congress] is 'primar-
ily concerned with domestic conditions.' " Id. at 1230 (quoting Benz v. Compania
Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957)).
55. Id. at 1231-33. The Court reasoned that such an interpretation would allow
an American citizen to bring suit against a foreign employer, as there was no distinc-
tion in Title VII between "American employer" and "employer." Id. at 1234.
The Court also rejected the petitioner's argument based on prior case law. Id.
The EEOC vigorously argued that the Court's decision in Steele v. Bulova Watch Co.,
344 U.S. 280 (1952), controlled the outcome of Arabian. In Steele, the Court held the
Lanham Act applied extraterritorially. Id. at 286. Since the Lanham Act and Title
VII both contain broad jurisdictional language, the EEOC argued that both Acts
should be given like treatment. The Court rejected this argument as well. The Court
explained that the Lanham Act, by its terms, regulates "all commerce which may
lawfully be regulated by Congress," including Congress' constitutional right to regu-
late commerce "with foreign Nations." Arabian, 111 S. Ct. at 1232 (citing 15 U.S.C.
§ 1127 (1988)). The Court stated that the boilerplate language of Title VII "does
not support such an expansive construction of congressional intent." Id. at 1233.
Thus, the Court found that the jurisdictional language of Title VII and prior case law
supported the presumption against extraterritorial application.
56. Arabian, 111 S. Ct. at 1234.
57. Id. The Court held that the proper deference to the guidelines depended
upon several factors, including consistency with prior and later pronouncements. Id.
Factors that determine the level of deference given to the EEOC include: "(1) the
thoroughness evident in its consideration; (2) the validity of its reasoning; (3) consis-
tency with earlier and later pronouncements, and (4) all those factors which give it
power to persuade, if lacking power to control." Id. (quoting General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140-46 (1976)).
58. Arabian, 111 S. Ct. at 1235-36. The Court indicated that Congress amended
other Acts to include application abroad and "should it wish to do so, may similarly
amend Title VII." Id.
1992]
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2. The Dissent
Justice Marshall's vigorous dissent focused on the presumption
against extraterritoriality.59 He stated that the presumption is not a
"clear statement rule," as the majority concluded, but rather a
method which invokes "the entire range of conventional sources
'whereby unexpressed congressional intent may be ascertained.' "60 In
contrast, the "clear statement rule" is to be applied only when "the
extraterritorial application of a statute would 'implicat[e] sensitive is-
sues of the authority of the Executive over relations with foreign na-
tions.' "61 Justice Marshall asserted that because the application of
Title VII to American nationals abroad would not disturb interna-
tional relations, a weak presumption doctrine applied, not the "clear
statement rule." 6 2
The dissent also addressed the alien exemption clause of Title
VII.63 Justice Marshall explained that the negative implication de-
rived from the alien exemption clause is "more than sufficient to re-
but the presumption against extraterritoriality."64 He characterized
59. Id. at 1237 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 1238 (emphasis in original) (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336
U.S. 281, 285 (1949). Chief Justice Marshall, in the seminal case of Murray v. The
Schooner Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 6 U.S. 64 (1804), set forth the foundation
for extraterritorial application of congressional acts. In Betsy, Marshall stated, "an act
of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other
possible construction remains." Id. at 118. From this statement evolved the struggle
between whether a "clear statement rule" or a "last resort standard" governs situa-
tions involving foreign application of United States law.
The standard of review depends upon the particular factual setting of an interna-
tional issue. If the application of U.S. law abroad would tend to conflict with interna-
tional issues, then the "clear statement rule" is the appropriate standard. See
McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Hondurus, 372 U.S. 10 (1962);
Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138 (1956). When the issues do
not involve "highly charged international circumstances," however, the "last resort
standard" is proper. McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 21; see also Foley Bros., Inc., v. Filardo,
336 U.S. 281 (1948).
The application of Title VII abroad to protect U.S. nationals working for Ameri-
can enterprises does not agitate any sensitive international issues. This is especially
true in light of the foreign compulsion defense available to such American companies
abroad and the general international consensus against discrimination. Therefore,
the "last resort standard" is more germane in the determination of whether Title VII
applied abroad than was the "clear statement rule."
61. The dissent relied on McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Hon-
duras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963) and Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138
(1957) for its formulation of the "clear-statement rule." Arabian, 111 S. Ct. at 1239
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 1240.
63. Id.
64. Id. The dissent argued that the legislative history of the alien exemption
clause also signified congressional intent to apply Title VII extraterritorially. Id. at
1241. Justice Marshall cited Senate and House reports which strongly suggest that
[Vol. 18
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the majority's claim that Congress disregarded the subject of foreign
law conflicts as "simply incorrect."65 Justice Marshall argued that
the alien exemption provision addresses foreign law concerns and
Congress intended it "to remove conflicts of law, ... between the United
States and a foreign nation" which may arise if an American com-
pany employs an alien abroad.66
Addressing the problem of international comity and the possibility
of U.S. law interfering with foreign law, Justice Marshall asserted that
two distinct statutory interpretations may be necessary. 67 Depend-
ing on the nationality of the regulated party, "the same statute might
be construed to apply extraterritorially to United States nationals but
not to foreign nationals."68 Thus, the dissent argued, the appropri-
ate statutory interpretation based upon the facts of each case could
reduce the apprehension created by concerns of potential interna-
Congress had extraterritorial application in mind when crafting the alien exemption
clause. These reports indicated that the intent of the exemption was to avoid "con-
flicts of law which might otherwise exist between the United States and a foreign nation in the
employment of aliens outside the United States by an American enterprise." Id. (alteration in
original) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 570, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1963), reprinted in CIVIL
RIGHTS, HEARINGS ON H.R. 7152).
Additionally, Justice Marshall noted that the majority did not provide an alterna-
tive explanation for the existence of the alien exemption clause consistent with its
position that Title VII has only a domestic scope. The majority, he explained,
adopted two raisons d'etre for the language of the alien exemption clause. Justice Mar-
shall found that the first is illogical and that the second "corroborates the conclusion
that Congress expected Title VII to apply extraterritorially." Arabian, 111 S. Ct. at
1242 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He concluded that the history of the alien exemption
clause solidifies the argument that Congress intended Title VII to apply extraterrito-
rially. Id.
65. Id. at 1243.
66. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 570, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
4, reprinted in Civil Rights Hearings, at 2303). Additionally, Justice Marshall noted that
the venue provision allows the charging party to file a claim in the district where the
discrimination occurred or where the employer has its principal office. Arabian, 111
S. Ct. at 1243 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The implication is that if an employer was
not found in any district, it must be outside the borders of the United States. Thus, if
venue extended to extraterritorial locations, then Title VII must also apply abroad.
Justice Marshall also mentioned that the EEOC has broad investigatory powers
which are without geographic limitation. He noted that the EEOC can investigate
charges in its principal office or "'at any other place." Id. (emphasis in original) (quot-
ing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(f)). In addition, he stated that although the subpoena
power of the EEOC is limited under Title VII, this limitation has no effect on the
extraterritorial reach of Title VII. Id.
67. Id. at 1244.
68. Id. As authority for this proposition, Justice Marshall cited two Lanham Act
cases: Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285-87 (1952), and Vanity Fair
Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 642-43 (2d Cir. 1956). Id. In Steele, the
Court applied the Lanham Act to a U.S. national for conduct abroad. Steele, 344 U.S.
at 285-87. However, in Vanity Fair Mills, the court declined to apply the Lanham Act
to a foreign national for conduct abroad. Vanity Fair Mills, 234 F.2d at 642-43.
1992]
11
Azman: The Development of Title VII Protection for American Citizens Emp
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1992
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
tional discord.69
Finally, Justice Marshall addressed the majority's attack on the
EEOC's interpretation that Title VII applied abroad. 70 The dissent
argued that the extraterritorial application of Title VII is supported
not only by its language and legislative history, but also by pertinent
administrative interpretations. Justice Marshall explained that since
1975, the EEOC has supported extraterritorial application of Title
V1171 and the majority erroneously used a 1970 regulation to contra-
dict EEOC policy.72
Justice Marshall concluded his dissent by stating that the majority
misused the presumption against extraterritoriality to bar considera-
tion of congressional intent which indicated Title VII was meant to
apply abroad.73
III. TODAY: THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991 AND THE
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF TITLE VII
Congress was swift in its response to the Arabian decision. The
Court decided Arabian on March 26, 1991.74 Two representatives in-
troduced bills to reverse the Court's decision on April 10 and 11.75
Additionally, Senator Edward Kennedy, stated that he intended to
69. Arabian, 111 S. Ct. at 1244 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall argued
that the legislative history of Title VII supports just such an interpretation. Id.
70. Id. at 1244-45.
71. Id. at 1245. In 1975, the General Counsel to the EEOC stated, in pertinent
part, "[t]he [alien exemption clause] does not similarly exempt from the provisions
of the Act, U.S. Citizens employed abroad by U.S. employers." Id. (quoting Letter
from W. Carey, EEOC General Counsel, to Senator Frank Church (Mar. 14, 1975)).
Additionally, Justice Marshall pointed out that the EEOC continually upheld this be-
lief in its decisions and policy guidelines. Id.
72. Id. at 1246. Interpreted correctly, Justice Marshall contended, neither resi-
dency nor citizenship controlled the enforcement of Title VII, and thus, the EEOC
did not contradict itself. Id. Additionally, Justice Marshall argued that the Depart-
ment of Justice also propounded its view that Title VII applies abroad, to which he
noted the majority had no response. Id. Specifically, the Department stated, "[o]nce
again the [statute] contains an exemption 'with respect to the employment of aliens
outside any State,' which implies that it is applicable to the employment of United
States citizens" by American companies abroad. Id. (quoting Foreign Investment and
Arab Boycott Legislation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Finance of the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 165 (1975) [testi-
mony of Assistant Attorney General Antonin Scalia]).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Representative William J. Jefferson, (Democrat, La.), and Representative
Kweisi Mfume, (Democrat, Md.), both introduced bills to counter the decision of the
Arabian Court. Both bills proposed an amendment to Title VII that extended Title
VII protection to American citizens when employed overseas by U.S. companies. See
H.R. 1694, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (introduced by Rep. Jefferson); H.R. 1741,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (introduced by Rep. Mfume).
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add a clause into a forthcoming version of the 1991 civil rights bill
that would mandate the extraterritorial application of Title VII.76
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to amend the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.77 The primary impetus behind the Act was to
"strengthen and improve Federal civil rights laws," 7 8 in order to
provide adequate remedies for discrimination and harassment in the
workplace. 79
In direct response to the Arabian decision, Congress included
within the Civil Rights Act of 1991 a provision that concisely and
succinctly amended Title VII to apply extraterritorially.8 0 The
amendment's definition of "employee" reads: "With respect to em-
ployment in a foreign country, such term includes an individual who
is a citizen of the United States." 8'
While the amendment clearly extends the application of Title VII
abroad, the determination of what or who is an "American em-
ployer" is not as clear.82 Additionally, it is unclear to what extent the
foreign compulsion defense will release U.S. employers.83
IV. TOMORROW: LITIGATION TO FURTHER DEFINE TITLE VII
Three issues will likely claim court attention as a result of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. The first is what type of companies are included
in the definition of "American employer." The second issue is
whether resident aliens travelling abroad for their American employ-
ers are entitled to Title VII protection. The last issue is the extent to
which courts will allow corporations to use the foreign compulsion
defense to avoid compliance with Title VII.
A. The American Employer
The issue of whether an employer is an "American employer"
arises when, for example, a company has operations in the United
States and also has an affiliate in another country. If an American
employee works abroad for an affiliate and discrimination occurs
76. See Civil Rights That Stop at Water's Edge, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1991, at M4.
77. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, 105 Stat. 1071 Pmbl. (1991).
78. Id.
79. Id. §§ 3(1), (4). This Note will address only § 109 of the Act, which concerns
the protection of extraterritorial employment.
80. 137 CONG. REC. H3922 (daily ed. June 5, 1991). The proposed amendment
received little debate; opposition was limited to a desire for hearings and debate on
the issue before passing it into law. Id. (statements of Rep. Goodling, (Republican,
Pa.), ranking member of the Committee on Education and Labor, and Rep. Sten-
holm, (Democrat, Tex.)).
81. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, § 109(a), 105 Stat. 1071,
1077 (1991).
82. Id. § 109(b), 105 Stat. at 1077.
83. See infra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
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against that employee, the employee must sue the American com-
pany. However, a court, for purposes of Title VII, will have jurisdic-
tion only if the American employer and the foreign affiliate are so
closely related to be perceived as a single American employer.84
Whether a foreign affiliate is an "American employer" is deter-
mined by an evaluation of the following four factors: (1) interrelation
of operations, (2) common management, (3) centralized control of
labor relations, and (4) common ownership or financial control.8 5
These factors were originally promulgated by the National Labor Re-
lations Board86 and have been incorporated into the Civil Rights Act
of 1991.87 Courts, in previous Title VII litigation, have considered
control over labor operations to be the most important factor in de-
termining whether related companies can be recognized as one
employer.88
It remains uncertain whether courts will strictly or leniantly con-
strue the definition of "American employer" when determining the
extraterritorial application of Title VII. Presumably, the liberal
stance courts have taken in applying Title VII should influence the
application of Title VII abroad.89 Courts have indicated that the
term "employer" should be given a liberal construction, enabling Ti-
tle VII to accomplish its goals.90 However, the courts may tighten
their traditionally liberal view of Title VII when applying it abroad
since it would be easy to implicate international issues in such a situ-
ation. In light of the international context, courts, to provide a fair
and logical framework for determining whether a company is an
"American employer," must therefore balance the interest of inter-
national comity and the employee's Title VII rights.
84. See McKenzie v. Davenport-Harris Funeral Home, 834 F.2d 930, 933-34
(llth Cir. 1987).
85. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, § 109(c)(3), 105 Stat. 1071,
1077 (1991).
86. See, e.g., Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians Local 1264 v. Broadcast
Serv. of Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 256 (1965); Evans v. McDonald's Corp., 936 F.2d
1087, 1089 (10th Cir. 1991); McKenzie v. Davenport-Harris Funeral Home, 834 F.2d
930, 933 (1 1th Cir. 1987); Baker v. Stuart Broadcasting Co., 560 F.2d 389, 392 (8th
Cir. 1977); Marques v. Digital Equip. Corp., 490 F. Supp. 56, 58 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 637
F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1980).
87. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, § 109(c)(3), 105 Stat. 1071,
1077 (1991).
88. See Evans, 936 F.2d at 1090 (citing Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 270
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 986 (1987)).
89. See Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1270 (7th Cir. 1991); Clay-
ton v. White Hall Sch. Dist., 875 F.2d 676, 679 (8th Cir. 1989); see also American
Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 80-81 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Hazel-
wood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 313 (1977) (Brennan,J., concurring).
90. See McKenzie, 834 F.2d at 933; Trevino v. Celanese Corp., 701 F.2d 397, 403
(5th Cir. 1983); Baker, 560 F.2d at 391.
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A second area of potential litigation is the alien exemption
clause. 9 1 Although the alien exemption clause clearly removes aliens
from the reach of Title VII if they are employed abroad, it is unclear
whether a resident alien of the United States is covered by Title VII
while temporarily or permanently out of the country on assign-
ment.9 2 The conflict arises when considering whether resident
aliens, although not citizens, are entitled to the same rights abroad as
when they legally reside within the United States.
9 3
Resident aliens, if substantial voluntary connections with the
United States have been lawfully established,9 4 are afforded the pro-
tections of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment.9 5 Res-
ident aliens, who have established these connections, should not be
deprived of constitutional protection when assigned overseas by
American employers.9 6 It would be inequitable to forcefully require
resident-aliens to relinquish their constitutional rights because the
91. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I (1988). See supra note 25 for the text of this clause.
92. For example, may an employee who is a U.S. resident of German alienage
bring a Title VII action against her American employer if the workplace is located in
Spain?
93. In Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973), the Court held that Con-
gress intended the alien exemption clause of Title VII to protect aliens within the
United States from employment discrimination. Id. at 95. Aliens are therefore con-
sidered "persons" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and are thus
already protected against discriminatory state action by the equal protection clause.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1; Foley v. Connelie, 419 F. Supp. 889, 891 (S.D.N.Y.
1976), aft'd, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)).
It is thus reasonable to conclude that the clause excludes aliens, not resident-aliens,
from Title VII protection abroad.
94. To invoke protection, "the resident-alien must first come within the territory
of the United States and [develop] substantial connections with this country."
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990).
95. See Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 n.5 (1953); Yick Wo, 118
U.S. at 369 (holding that Fourteenth Amendment protects resident aliens).
96. Case law suggests that resident aliens are entitled to constitutional protec-
tion while assigned overseas. However, the extent of their constitutional rights de-
pends upon the individual circumstances. For example, a resident alien who is
actively planning to become a naturalized American citizen should be guaranteed
more rights than a resident alien who remains abroad for an extended period of time
without intending to become an American citizen. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459
U.S. 21, 32-33 (1982) (noting that once an alien initiates steps toward establishing
residency, her constitutional rights change accordingly); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339
U.S. 763, 770 (1950) (holding that rights "become more extensive and secure when
[the alien] makes preliminary declaration of intention to become a citizen").
In any case, brief trips abroad should not divest authorized resident aliens from
previously attached American rights. Landon, 459 U.S. at 34 (holding that a resident-
alien who has left the country for only a few days is entitled to due process).
For procedures on becoming a naturalized U.S. citizen, see 8 U.S.C. § 1443
(1988) and 8 C.F.R. §§ 332.11, 337, 343a (1991).
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geographic location of their workplace has been temporarily or per-
manently changed.97
C. Defenses to Title VII
A third area of potential litigation arises when an American em-
ployer seeks exemption from Title VII because compliance would vi-
olate the laws of the host nation. This defense, namely the foreign
compulsion defense, was accepted by courts to avoid the collision of
U.S. laws and the laws of foreign nations.98 Congress has incorpo-
rated the foreign compulsion defense into the provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.99
The foreign compulsion defense protects U.S. businesses by elimi-
nating domestic liability for a violation of Title VII where the illegal
acts are compelled by the laws of the host country.OO The defense
has traditionally been invoked in antitrust disputeslol but may be a
viable strategy in litigating the extraterritoriality of Title VII.102
Courts, to avoid deciding issues of foreign diplomacy, may permit
prohibited activities to continue in accordance with foreign laws.10 3
To successfully invoke the foreign compulsion doctrine, an Ameri-
can corporation must be required to comply with a host state's bind-
97. Although Title VII protection is not a constitutional right, the resident alien
has a due process right to be heard on the basis of a Title VII claim. See supra note
93.
98. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Hondurus, 372
U.S. 10, 11-22 (1963); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952); United
States v. General Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. 835, 878 (D.N.J. 1953).
99. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, § 109(b)(1)(B), 105 Stat. 1071,
1077 (1991).
100. See Cohn, supra note 5, at 1311-13. The defense "is a corollary to the act of
state doctrine, which prohibits United States courts from adjudicating the validity of
acts of another sovereign nation." Id. at 1313; see also Williams v. Curtiss-Wright
Corp., 694 F.2d 300, 303 (3rd Cir. 1982). Generally, the foreign compulsion defense
is available only when the host country has required compliance through laws or
regulations subject to penal or other severe sanctions. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6,
§ 441 cmt. c. The defense may protect against threats to existing valuable business
arrangements but probably will not cover the solicitation of new business ventures.
Id.
101. McGhee v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 871 F.2d 1412, 1419 n.4 (9th Cir. 1989);
Phoenix Canada Oil Co., Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 445, 458 (D. Del. 1978);
Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291, 1296 (D.
Del. 1970); see also Pierre Vogelenzang, Note, Foreign Sovereign Compulsion in American
Antitrust Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 131 (1980).
102. See Cohn, supra note 5, at 1312 for a discussion of the foreign compulsion
defense and Title VII.
103. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 441(1); cf. id. § 402(2) (stating that state may
control the activities of its nationals outside its borders). The defendant has the bur-
den of proving that the laws of the host country compelled the violation of U.S. laws.
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1293 (3d Cir. 1979).
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ing laws, not guidelines, and noncompliance must be threatening to
existing valuable business arrangements. 0 4 For example, a threat
by the host country to revoke a license required to remain in busi-
ness may be severe enough to sustain the foreign compulsion de-
fense. However, possibility of civil liability or a loss of customers will
probably be insufficient to support the defense.105 In sum, an Amer-
ican employer abroad must comply with Title VII unless it can prove
that it also must comply with the foreign law or face severe
penalty. 106
V. CONCLUSION
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 signaled a giant step forward in the
effort to eradicate the moral and economic indignation experienced
by many Americans. The objectives of Title VII are especially sacro-
sanct because they protect equal access to the labor market, and ulti-
mately preserve the dignity of self-sufficiency. Even today, the
United States is only grudgingly becoming a part of the international
movement to eliminate all forms of discrimination. The Arabian deci-
sion temporarily stalled domestic efforts to establish fair employ-
ment practices and briefly signalled to the rest of the world that the
United States does not follow the same policies it advocates.
The 102d Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in order to
further the cause against discrimination, especially in the workplace.
In so doing, Congress has recognized the importance of a wholesale
ban on employment discrimination, a ban that does not turn its back
on our citizens abroad.
Mark R. Azman
104. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 441 cmt. c.
105. Id.
106. It is important to note, however, that even in a situation where the foreign
compulsion defense has not been sufficiently proven, a U.S. court may nevertheless
decline to exercise jurisdiction because it is unreasonable or because the law of the
foreign country more appropriately redresses the grievance. See RESTATEMENT. supra
note 6, § 441 reporter's note 3.
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